About Us

Operation Koevoet began with these five men and they were issued with two sedan motor vehicles and two bakkies. I was one of the first Security Branch officers of the South African Police who had served in Rhodesia with the Special Branch of the British South Africa Police in 1973. A counter-terrorism expert of the South African Police, Colonel Johan Viktor, and I visited Rhodesia once again to acquaint ourselves with the local conditions. Here we went to all the hot spots and had discussions with Colonel Ron Reid-Daly of the Selous Scouts, whose operations were at this time in full swing. It was in Rhodesia that I first encountered the V-frame vehicles called the Rhino, built on the Land Rover chassis.

I also visited the Recce base at Mtubatuba where I met Colonel Joe Verster and Charl Naudé. They were from 5 RC and were also training some black Rhodesians. I then flew up to Oshakati where I had talks with Lieutenant Colonel Willem Schoon who was in charge of the Security Branch at Oshakati.

After this orientation my team reported at Oshakati on 11 January 1979 and settled in with 5 RC to assist them with information on SWAPO. Next to 5 RC was a vacant piece of land with four soil banks around it for safety. Nearby was a heli-pad. The idea was that Koevoet would be involved in covert warfare. Koevoet had no special equipment or office furniture. The poor Special Branch officers did not even have chairs to sit on. They were each armed only with the .32 Walther PPK pistols issued to all detectives and Security Branch members. I had obtained R500 from Colonel Piet Goosen from the security fund at head office to reward informers.

We then moved in with 5 RC where I occupied an office. We perused all Schoon’s files on suspected terrorist and did a great deal of research. The whole set-up was very strange to me. Movement of people and even the police was restricted. On the tar roads you could expect an ambush; on the unpaved roads you could expect a landmine. A policeman needed an escort to perform routine police functions. Schoon seconded four seasoned African members to Koevoet: Warrant Officers Gabriel David and Kandofi, as well as Sergeants Johannes Kwagadi and Willigoe.

We spent time talking to these local Security Branch officers, in the process obtaining a broad picture of the local situation facing them. Our object was to build up an exclusive clandestine Security Branch on the Rhodesian model, which we adapted to local conditions, as the flat topography was different from Rhodesia. We were now desperately searching for captured terrorists to interrogate but we did not have any luck. Then Koevoet tried a new tactic. We took fifteen men and fifteen women and used them to set up cuca shops. This operation was not very successful. Communication was a problem because of a curfew that was imposed – if the army did not shoot you, the terrorists would! It was then decided to give some of the cuca shops a bakkie (pick-up truck) so that the staff could move around and bring information to Koevoet. Some of these bakkies soon became taxis!

The members were not short of ingenuity and set to work providing bases, housing and detention facilities as well as the administrative facilities which were increasingly in demand. Members also built their own identification facilities and bakkies with tinted windscreens were acquired to facilitate the identification of suspected terrorists. These bakkies were known as the spotter and the ‘vangkar’, a snatch vehicle as used by the British in Northern Ireland. Many terrorists, particularly the saboteurs and political commissars who were often involved in political murders in Windhoek, Walvis Bay and Keetmanshoop, were subsequently arrested using this method.

At this stage it also became necessary to deal with the activities of the gangs of armed terrorists active in the bush. The next step was to get more staff who knew the area. We found Lieutenant Eugene de Kock and Sergeant Chris Nel who were involved in the training of the Local Constabulary Guard Force (Tuiswag), a Special Branch project with the aim of enabling the local trained constabulary to guard their local installations and local chiefs. Schoon transferred two more vehicles to Koevoet. I sent men to explore Western Ovamboland. Roads were non-existent; it was mainly sand tracks that they travelled on. Requisitioning firearms from Pretoria, we received old FNs with wooden butts. These were sent back and we were pleased to receive new R1s and later we received HMCs (hand machine carbines). With two more members we needed more trained locals.

With more staff, Koevoet needed office space. We then moved to the so-called White House where Captain George Steyn was training the special constables. This concept appealed to me. We had now been in Ovamboland for three months and had not yet achieved any positive results. We moved to some empty houses in Oshakati. I then issued a command, ‘Arrest a terrorist!’ As a result, two young terrorists were arrested in the Kaokoveld and brought before me. They were interrogated but to no avail.

Then quite by chance the breakthrough came. Captain Coetzee Els and Gabriel were on investigation when they saw a man riding a bicycle. The Warrant Officer told Els that the man was wearing a shirt that was not locally available. They stopped to question the cyclist. He fled and a Tokarev pistol fell out of his pants. He was taken in for questioning and within one-hour Koevoet knew everything about SWAPO in central Ovambo! The ice had been broken and one arrest led to another. All the SWAPO structures were dissected and Koevoet started to solve the cases of murder and sabotage. More arrests followed. The cyclist who had been arrested first, was in charge of sabotaging the power lines and knew where his cadres were staying and what their tasks were. The arrested terrorists were detained at 5 Recce, Fort Rev. Detailed statements were given to the Recces, who then submitted a detailed security report saying that the information had been obtained from an Army source.

Subsequently, our men then obtained information about ninety terrorists that had infiltrated into the area. Lieutenant Erwee and some men were travelling near Oshikango when they were lucky enough to arrest the commander of these ninety men, as well as an infamous terrorist also wanted by Koevoet. After interrogation they obtained more information and slowly started to obtain the various noms de guerre. The leader of the pack’s nom de guerre was Artillery and he was now safely in custody. The information was given to the Defence Force and paratroopers were deployed to arrest the group of ninety. I also asked that any young male found in the vicinity be brought in. People were then arrested indiscriminately, from old to young. One man had a denim pair of trousers on and he was questioned. Artillery subsequently identified this man as the commander of his mortar section. After questioning, all information obtained was followed up and arrests followed. After this exercise Koevoet knew of all incidents that had taken place south of the Red Line. Frans Conradie, an ex-policeman, transferred across to us from the Recces and was to become a legend as a fighting team leader.

Koevoet was operating clandestinely and more staff was added to increase the establishment. Lieutenant General Vic Verster, OC the SA Police Counter-Insurgency Unit visited Ovamboland and I asked for sixty recently trained special constables. I found a farm suitable for further training, situated south of the cutline, the line of latitude dividing SWA and Angola and a zone several hundred metres wide, which had been cleared of trees for hundreds of kilometres. In addition, we had to keep the men busy, both captured terrorists and special constables. By my calculation we captured about 500 terrorists during the eleven years. We always had about a hundred men whom we had to keep occupied. We bought the farm for this purpose and so that they could learn useful skills. The farm was 6 000 hectares and we taught the men building, brick-laying, plastering, electrical work, plumbing, working with animals, crops and citrus farming.

Food and tents were scrounged from the Army and training started. The new recruits were intensively trained and then deployed in fighting teams. De Kock asked to be involved in these operations and was given authority to pick his own team. The success rate of Koevoet increased and follow-up operations produced information leading to arrests for various acts of terrorism committed in the south of SWA, thus solving crimes as far south as Walvis Bay and Swakopmund. 

With the assistance of two senior Ovambo members of the special constable force sixty members were recruited who underwent training in combat techniques. The black members were initially given a three-month basic training by Schoon at the Wanela Camp at Ondangwa. Then they had another month of more specialised training with Chris Nel. These men were natural trackers. A white member had to be an investigator and was subjected to a three-week bush-training course with Koevoet. He needed to know how weapons worked, how to drive a Casspir, radio communication, air contact officer duties and so forth.

Great emphasis was laid on radio communication and procedures. It should be borne in mind that many of the people hadn’t been to school but were nevertheless highly intelligent and made good policemen. Koevoet itself had a mechanical school for driver training. The men didn’t drive on roads but in the bush. As time went by and with experience we hit on the right recipe, which enabled us to create a formidable, skilled fighting force.

I was now sure that my men were on the right track. Space was a still problem and detention cells were needed for holding arrested terrorists. Elements of the SA Police (Counter-Insurgency) were later withdrawn and we obtained their equipment. We then established our own base for Koevoet. The SA Police Special Task Force and trackers from the SA Police Dog Units also assisted in some cases. Koevoet went from strength to strength and at its peak it had 3 000 well-trained policemen who had mastered the art of bush fighting. They were also trained in the art of tracking, an art in which most black members excelled. Each fighting team consisted of four Casspirs with one white and ten African members in each Casspir; one Blesbok (freight) with two Africans; and forty-six men in total. In its first year of operation Koevoet eliminated 511 SWAPO terrorists.

Initially we wore the SAP camouflage uniform. With the establishment of SWAPOL that force got its own uniform and we also wore that uniform. The men also wore T shirts, shorts and tackies as they had to run for kilometres. Then in 1984 I put my foot down: ‘Koevoet members must have their own uniform.’ So, we got a green uniform. We found that while tracking we couldn’t wear heavy leather boots. We had input from our black staff and they preferred tackies in the form of green boots. Green canvas boots were obtained and although they did not last very long, seemed to be favoured by the trackers. They added an interesting aroma to the general smell of unwashed bodies when we were travelling in the Casspirs.

At first, we had a mixture of weapons. Some men just used captured terrorist weapons. When the R5 became available General Dolf Gouws ordered it for Koevoet. On the Casspirs we used the PKM, RDP, AKM and many of the 30s, 50s and later 20 mm cannons purchased through Armscor. We had no body bags or gloves; this was in the days before people were afraid of AIDS. Everybody told its own story; from the body we could tell what group the deceased had served in. Casspirs are cramped and, as everyone knows, it is hot and bodies decay. That was why we tied the bodies to the spare wheel of the Casspir or had them flown in. The preference was to have all the dead and injured flown in.

During the eleven years of Operation Koevoet’s existence there were wonderful achievements: very young members and bravery without equal became the hallmarks of the organisation. I remember an incident where a fighting team under the command of Sergeant de Wit (ZW) detonated a landmine in the west of Ovambo. Just a single terrorist spoor was found on the scene. After four day’s pursuit over a distance of about seventy kilometres the man who had planted the landmine was tracked and effectively put out of action.

There is no doubt that the contribution made by Operation Koevoet enabled the SA government to negotiate successfully with SWAPO elements. However, the treacherous way in which SWAPO tried to hijack the election by force on 1 April 1979 failed miserably as a result of Koevoet’s intervention. That day a large group of up to 400 men attacked us after we had been virtually disarmed in terms of the agreement. During the following nine days of bloody war and violence, Koevoet inflicted the heaviest losses which SWAPO had ever suffered. It was also the most courageous, fearless and ingenious action by this fighting unit.    

In conclusion mention must be made of the enormous contributions of the South African Air Force and the medical unit of the South African Medical Services and the Defence Force with their armoured vehicles and casevac helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft and their transporting of injured members for treatment at 1 Military Hospital in Pretoria. These units were certainly in a class of their own and played a role in almost every contact that Koevoet was involved in. Great appreciation is also expressed for the close cooperation with the SADF command structure and particularly the sector, batallion and logistical commanders. The cooperation with Generals ‘Witkop’ Badenhorst, ‘Joep’ Joubert, ‘Jakes’ Jacobs and Serfontein was outstanding. (SVZ: It was general knowledge that there was actually very little cooperation between Badenhorst and Ops K)

My Koevoet team and I were originally detectives, investigating officers who could investigate a matter and find clues. In the old days we followed a system whereby every detective had a black detective to assist him. The detective knew the people and the environment and no information was ever beyond their reach. I started to apply the same system to Koevoet: mainly, initially, experienced detectives from Natal assisted by local people with an extensive knowledge of the area, the people, their culture and habits.

Initially we had two detectives for every white member but later the system worked so well that we we gave every detective ten black members. This was a formidable combination. These people obtained information, which was quickly translated and we reacted immediately. We were information-driven and very successful.

I would like to ask the armchair critics, ‘How did we obtain all that information from the population through local members of Koevoet if we were so brutal?’ It was sometimes unavoidable that we chased over their fields or burst through their wattle and daub huts but it must be borne in mind that this was war: we were being shot at and we shot back and, in the melee, we headed straight for the enemy. Remember our Koevoet men were from the community and had to go home again during off-duty periods.

The role of Koevoet was in fact as a support unit in the combined effort of the security forces under the command of the SA Defence Force, which in my view compares with the best in the world. (M 18/11/2010) (SVZ 15.02.2011)